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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN E. McNAUGHTON and HEN- \ 
RIETTA McNAUGHTON, his wife, 
Appellants and Plaintiffs, 
-vs.-
JOHN B. EATON, an unmarried 
man; MYRTLE ROSS; JAMES H. 
FISHER and CUN A FISHER, 
husband and wife; RICE COOPER 
and EDITH R. LAWRENCE 
COOPER, husband and wife; W. S. 
ROSS; and FERN ROSS FA W-
CETT; JACK TURNER and 
MARIE TURNER, his wife, and 
MYRON PERRY, 
.Appellees and Defendants. 
Case No. 
8277 
Brief of Appellants 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
John E. McNaughton and his wife, appellants here, 
originally brought this action to quiet title to the waters 
of MeN a ugh ton Gulch. The defendants answered, claim-
ing that they were the owners of all the waters arising 
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in l\ticNaughton Gulch and denying that the plaintiffs had 
any interest therein. At the original trial the court 
awarded the water to the plaintiffs, but erroneously based 
its judgment on the theory that the waters were private 
waters not subject to the law of appropriation. The trial 
court found, however, that if the waters were subject to 
the doctrine of appropriation, plaintiffs were the senior 
appropriators with rights superior to the rights of any 
of the defendants. The defendants appealed. This court 
on the original appeal reversed the trial court's holding 
that the waters were private waters, but affirmed the 
trial court in its determination that the plaintiffs were 
the senior appropriators. The Supreme Court's prior 
opinion is reported in 242 P. 2d 570. 
The Supreme Court remanded the case with instruc-
tions to enter judgment in accordance with its opinion. 
A further hearing was had. The trial court again held 
that the plaintiffs were the senior appropriators, fixed 
the duty of water at 3.5 acre feet of water per year, and 
then placed various restrictions on plaintiffs' right to 
use the water and entered an injunction against the 
plaintiffs. The nature of these restrictions and of the 
injunction can best be detailed in connection with the 
Statement of Facts and Argument, but it is because of 
these restrictions and the injunction that McNaughtons 
have now appealed. Suffice it to note here that the court 
order has taken from the plaintiffs nearly 80% of the 
water they have historically used. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
From the trial court's findings and the determination 
of the Supreme Court, we consider the following facts to 
be established. McNaughton Gulch is a natural water-
way formed by water erosion from natural sources. The 
gulch varies from three to five rods in width and from 
five to fifteen feet in depth with steep banks on either 
side. The surrounding country is nearly flat with a 
gradual slope toward the gulch and generally to the 
south and east. The defendants' lands are all located 
below the plaintiffs' lands in the east half of the same 
section. (See Supreme Court's opinion.) 
Historically the plaintiffs have diverted the gulch 
waters by a number of dams. The highest one is about 
a quarter of a mile upstream from plaintiffs' land and 
the water is conveyed on to their land below by means of 
a ditch. The lowest dam is on the boundary line between 
plaintiffs' two forty acre tracts and only a little more 
than a quarter of a mile downstream from their west 
boundary line. 
The Supreme Court noted that the waters accumu-
lating in the gulch reached the gulch by five different 
means, to wit: (1) Waters which drain into the gulch 
from natural sources; (2) Canal surplus and waste 
waters turned into the gulch merely to get rid of them; 
{3) Canal waters used to irrigate lands on both sides of 
the gulch which drain into it above the plaintiffs' lands; 
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
( 4) Canal waters used to irrigate the plaintiffs' lands 
by draining into the gulch above the plaintiffs' lowest 
dam; (5) Canal "\Vaters tu~"ned into the gulch to be used 
by them to irrigate their lands. 
The Supreme Court then went on to note that: 
''The first three of the above divisions are 
subject to appropriation either as the waters of 
a natural stream or waters which have been once 
appropriated but allo,ved to drain into a natura] 
water course beyond the control of the original 
appropriator. The last two divisions are not sub-
ject to appropriation because they are still in the 
possession of the plaintiffs who have the right to 
use them under the original appropriation. The 
trial court correctly held that plaintiffs have the 
prior right to use all of these waters because as 
to the first three divisions they had first appropri-
ated them to a beneficial use before 1903 when no 
application to appropriate was necessary, but the 
court erred in holding that plaintiffs' rights to 
the use of these waters are not subject to reason-
able regulation and control in the saving of 
water." 
Since this appeal is taken because of the regulations 
and controls placed on plaintiffs, the facts which are 
material to the regulation are specifically set out as a 
part of the argument. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS ON APPEAL 
I. The Court erred in fixing a definite time schedule 
for the use of water by plaintiffs and appellants. 
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II. The Court erred in limiting appellants to t"ro 
cubic feet of water per second and enjoining them from 
utilizing more than said quantity of water at any time. 
III. That the court erred in lim.iting the irrigation 
season to 150 days and in prohibiting any use of water 
after September 22nd. 
IV. That the court erred in entering any InJunc-
tion against plaintiffs and appellants. 
V. The court erred in requiring the appellants to 
construct appropriate by-pass facilities at their expense. 
VI. The court erred in failing and refusing to place 
any time limits or to fix the duty, or in other "\vise deter-
mine and define the r~ghts of the defendants and in re-
fusing to enjoin them from using water in excess of their 
rights. 
VII. The court erred in fixing the duty of \vater at 
3.5 acre feet per acre. 
VIII. The court erred 1n refusing to enter para-
graph 9 of the proposed decree. 
IX. The court erred in refusing to enter proposed 
Finding of Fact No. 16 to the effect that the Supreme 
Court had determined that there were five classes of 
water reaching MeN a ugh ton Gulch, two of which were 
McNaughton's private waters, and that McNaughton can 
use the McNaughton Gulch as a part of his lateral or 
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irrigating system and can divert and recapture his water 
in the McNaughton Gulch. 
X. The court erred in refusing to adjudge by its 
decree that none of the defendants has any interest in 
McNaughton's canal stock, and that he can use the same 
at such times as he desires without regard to the de-
fendants. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THIS 
COURT ON THE ORIGINAL APPEAL ARE THE 
LAW OF THE CASE. 
We think it 'veil at the outset to note that such mat-
ters as this court determined on its piror appeal have 
become the law of the case, binding on the parties, the 
trial court and the Supreme Court, and are not now sub-
ject to reexamination. This court has so held on numer-
ous occasions.1 
The Supreme Court has expressly held that appel-
lants here are the senior appropriators with rights su-
perior to the rights of any of the defendants ; that they 
1See, for example, Powerine Company v. Zions Savings Bank & 
Trust Company, et al., 106 Utah 384, 148 P. 2d 807, and Gray v. DeFay, 
107 Utah 172, 153 P. 2d 544. In the Powerine case on a second appeal 
the Supreme Court said: 
"We shall not review our pronouncements heretofore made in 
this case, nor shall we discuss the errors assigned if they deal with 
matters discussed in the previous opinion and upon which no new 
determination should have been made by the trial court, except by 
way of entering findings to confonn to our previous opinion. * * * 
"Our pronouncements are the law of the case, binding no less 
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used the water prior to 1903 about as they now use it, 
and that the trial court's findings in regard to appellants' 
prior appropriation should be affirmed. The trial court 
in its Memorandum Decision (R. 36) also applied this 
principle and upon that theory re-entered verbatim its 
Findings Nos. 1-9, included in which are many of the 
critical facts which will control this appeal. 
POINT II. THE COURT ERRED IN FIXING A 
DEFINITE TIME SCHEDULE FOR THE USE 
OF WATER BY PLAINTIFFS AND IN LIMIT-
ING PLAINTIFFS TO 2 C.F.S. OF WATER 
DURING SAID PERIOD. 
The trial court noted in its original findings, (R. 11) 
and in its findings entered after the retrial, (R. 70) that 
the amount of water finding its way into the MeN a ugh ton 
Gulch ''varies from day to day and from season to sea-
son, depending upon the irrigation practices prevailing 
on these adjacent lands; that the amount of water avail-
able for diversion from the gulch on to the MeN aughton 
lands is not measurable* * * (Finding 6) that the volume 
of seepage or waste water flowing into the McNaughton 
Gulch has increased with the increase of irrigation within 
its drainage area, until at the high point of flow there 
may be several cubic feet per second flowing into the 
gulch, but the flow is not constant and the amount at its 
lowest ebb is of a negligible amount." 
This finding as to the variable flow from day to day 
and from season to season was challenged by the de-
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fendants in their :fi~st appeal, but the finding was not 
disturbed by the Supreme Court. Even had these findings 
not become the la\v of the cases, the evidence 'vould 
compel the conclusion that the stream has a variable 
flov1; that when upstream irrigators are wasteful in the 
application of "\IVa ter the flow of water in the gulch is 
high, and when they are careful in their irrigation prac-
tices the flow may be of negligible amount. 
In almost the exact words of this trial court's find-
ings, Carroll testified at pages 53 and 55 that t~e v" .. ater 
is not measurable. He also testified at page 52, as follows: 
'' Q. Is the amount which flovvs therein con-
sistent from day to day, and season~ 
A. Varies all the time. 
Q. Does it vary day to day in the same season~ 
A. Yes, because we have irrigation on each 
side, and sometimes the \Vaste "\Vater runs in and 
it will raise, and the next day somebody shuts their 
vvrater off and there \VOn 't be as much in there. 
Q. Do the upper irrigators permit their waste 
"\Vater to run into the gulch~ 
\ y . '' 
.1.1... es, sir. 
John ~feN aughton testified (R. 158) as follows: 
I 
"Well, I have observed the gulch for all these 
years, and I find that the gulch fluctuates from 
year to year and day to day, and it is pretty hard 
to tell just ho\v much water you are going to 
have * * * 
' 
Q. Do you know what causes it to fluctuate 
from day to day~ 
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.1:\. It is caused by the amount of irrigation on 
each side of the gulch; that is one of the causes . 
..:\.nd, of course, from the use of the water by the 
neighbors above. Sometimes they are not so care-
ful about their \Vater, they let it run through and 
return \Yaste water, so the gulch fluctuates fron1 
" ... aste v .... ater as " ... ell as the seepage "rater.'' 
The fact that the stream is variable is of critical 
importance. The trial court in its decree fixed the duty 
of \Vater at 3.5 acre feet of \Yater per acre per year, and 
on the basis of 66.03 acres being irrigated the court 
R\varded plaintiff 231.05 acre feet of water each year, (R. 
7 4). Hovvever, the court restricted the plaintiff to diver-
sions from the 1\IcN a ugh ton Gulch of not more than t\tvo 
cubic feet of \Vater per second during an exact 92 hour 
2-± minute period during each ten consecutive days. If 
there \vere ahvays two cubic feet of \Yater per second or 
more in the gulch during the particular 92 hour 24 rninute 
period \vhen the plaintiffs are permitted by the decree 
to use water, they \vould be able to get exactly 3.5 acrP 
feet of \Vater per acre, or 231.05 acre feet per year. If, 
ho\vever, at any time during their 92 hour turn the gulch 
should yield less than 2 c.f.s. of water, they would not be 
able to get the \Vater \vhich the trial court and this court 
have adjudged that they appropriated. Since the court 
has found and it is the lavv of the ease that the stream 
varies from day to day and from season to season, and 
the flow is at times of negligible amount, it \vas error to 
put the plaintiffs on such a restricted basis \vithout pro-
vision to protect their rights against the variable flo" ... 
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so t:Q.at they would in any event be permitted to take the 
231 acre feet awarded to them. 
Historically the plaintiffs have 11sed the water a.s it 
accumulated at their points of diversion, taking such 
quantities as were available. Every witness testifying 
on the subject admitted that for over half a century 
~1cN a ugh ton has maintained a tight dam across the Mc-
Naughton Gulch abov~ the points of diversion used by 
the defendants, (R. 12, 15, 19, 63, 73, 100, 140). There 
was undisputed evidence to the effect that from 1900 to 
1948 there was no complaint from anyone and no trouble 
on the stream, (R. 183). Even the predecessors in inter-
est to the defendants so admitted. Ed Hoeft, predecessor 
in interest to one of the defendants testified that from 
1909 until he sold the property he had never had any 
occasion to disturb the McNaughton Dam, (R. 102). 
Ernest J o"hnson, \vho owned part of the defendants' lands 
said that he never bothered to walk upstream during the 
time he farmed the lands (R. 125). Mr. Ross, who was 
a predecessor in interest to some of the defendants, was 
ou the stream for 48 years, and he never once had occa-
sion to go upstream to the l\1:cNaughton farm (R. 33). 
John B. Eaton has farm.ed some of defendant's property 
for 35 years, and he never during all of that time had 
occasion to go to the MeN a ugh ton property until 1948 
when this trouble started, (R. 353). 
It thus seems undisputably established that for half 
a century McNaughton has maintained tight dams across 
McNaughton Gulch, diverting the water accumulating 
therein on to his lands and done of the defendants or their 
10 
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predecessors interfered until1948. In 1947 the lVlcN a ugh-
ton Dam "\Yas "rashed out, (R. 375). McNaughton replaced 
it in 1948, (R. 171). When the dam was replaced the 
'vater 'vas shut off. Fisher, who had just become an 
owner of land on the gulch (R. 275) missed the water 
and 'vent upstream to find it, ( R. 27 6, 293). He sa 'v the 
dams and ditches of McNaughton. The dam had been 
recently replaced, and the ditches had been cleared. 
Fisher thought the dam and ditches were new construc-
tion ( R. 281, 287). He took his shovel and diverted the 
"\Vater out of the l\icN aughton ditches, (R. 294) and then 
had MeN a ugh ton arrested. This precipitated the filing 
of this la,vsuit, in which the trial court and the Supreme 
Court have both held that MeN a ugh ton's right is prior 
to the rights of any of the defendants. 
It is clear from the evidence that McNaughton's 
ditches are large enough to take more than six c.f.s. of 
"\Vater at the same time, (Retrial R. 26). Even though ~le­
N a ugh ton has diverted all of the water which has accu-
mulated in the gulch, he has found it necessary to divert 
water from the Ashley Canal, in which he owns stock, 
and supplement the gulch water with it, (R. 29, 221, 101, 
152). Since the stream varies even within the same day 
because of the practices of upstream irrigators, it is 
difficult for McNaughton to know when the water 'vill 
be in the gulch and how much ·\vater he 'vill have at any 
given time, (R. 158). 
McNaughtons' land sloped to the gulch and there 
IS a drain ditch along the entire lo,ver (east) end of 
11 
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the ~leN a ugh ton laud, (R. Ex. 1, Ex. A, 261, 262, Find-
ing 10). If the tight dam under any particular circum-
stance should diYert surplus \Vater on to l\lcN a ugh tons' 
lands it "\vould return directly to the gulch. There is no 
place else it could go and both the drain ditch and the 
points at \vhich the \Yater \Vould run on the surface to 
the gulch are upstream from all the defendants' lands. 
On a variable, unmeasureable stream, the manner in 
\vhich the parties peaceably functioned all these years 
is probably the best method of handling the administra-
tion of the stream. 
In any event, the prior or senior right of ~feN a ugh-
tons to take the water needed by his lands is totally 
defeated \Yhere on a variable stream the court limits him 
to a rigid schedule of hours and a maximum rate of flow 
as "\vas done here. It assumes a constant :flo\v of more 
than 2 c.f.s. If at any time during his 92 hour turn the 
flow is less than 2 c.f.s. he will not get his "~ater. The 
court has found that the flo\v is variable and at times is 
negligible. In the face of this finding the rigid schedule 
of hours and the 2 c.f.s. limit cannot stand. 
POINT III. THE COURT ERRED IN LilMITING 
THE IRRIGATON SEASON TO 150 DAYS. 
The discussion under Point III is really inter-related 
'vith the discussions under Points IV and V, "~hich relate 
to the issuance of an injunction against the plaintiffs 
and the fixing of a duty as low a.s 3.5 acre feet. We 'viii 
refer here only to the basis of the court's order, and will 
12 
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then relate the matter to the argument under Points IV 
and V. 
In its originall\iemorandum Decision the court fixed 
the duty of 'vater at 3.5 acre feet per acre per year, and 
the irrigation season at 180 days, ( R. 51). The court 
had also made a mathematical error in its computation, 
and :NicN aughtons filed a motion for correction of the 
error and for reconsideration, (R. 53). The l\IcNaughtons 
had called David I. Gardner, an engineer, as an expert 
on the duty of "\Yater. Mr. Gardner testified that in his 
opinion a 180 day irrigation season was desirable in the 
\Ternal area, (Retrial 84). He noted that the McNaugh-
ton land was uneven and that irrigation of the high spots 
\Vould require an excess application of water in the 
swales. He also noted various other criteria which affect 
the duty of water, and expressed his opinion that six 
acre feet of water per acre per year was necessary, (Re-
trial 22, 23, 48 and 75). The defendants called lVIr. Chris-
tensen as an expert. He testified that three acre feet per 
acre would be necessary on the portions of the land which 
had good soil (Retrial 95) and that more \Vater would 
be necessary on the portions of the land which had sandy 
soil, (Retrial 99). Defendants also sought to fix a 150 
day irrigation season, (Retrial R. 113). We will have 
occasion to refer to his testimony again under the argu-
ment on duty of water, but we note here that in the 
court's original memorandum it accepted Mr. Christen-
sen's testimony that 3 acre feet per acre was sufficient 
water and then accepted Mr. Gardner's testimony on the 
180 day irrigation season, (R. 51). By rotating the use 
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of 'vater on ten day turns McNaughtons would be give11 
eighteen irrigation turns per 180 day season. The court's 
award of 3.5 acre feet of water per acre ( 42 i11ches per 
acre) when divided into eighteen turns, would allow only 
slightly more than two inches of water per irrigation 
turn. Even if the crops could absorb 100 per cent of the 
water applied to the land with no waste, this would not 
mature crops. Therefore, in order to avoid an anomalous 
result, we urge the court to either increase the amount 
of water so that in each of the eighteen turns more water 
could be applied, or in the alternative to shorten the 
season, (R. 59). The court refused to increase the amount 
above 3.5 acre feet, but did cut the length of the season. 
The evidence shows that the 150 day turn will prove 
too short. Gardner said that the growing season for corn 
and alfalfa is 180 days, (Retrial R. 8). Defendants' wit-
ness Turner did not kno'v the growing season, (Retrial 
R. 105). McNaughton testified that the season might in 
some years begin as early as March on pasture land and 
in some years continue as late as November, (Retrial 
R. 110). Defendants' witness Hacking said the "frost 
free'' period is generally between May and September, 
but sometimes it is earlier, sometimes later, (Retrial R. 
112). He said he begins to irrigate in the spring "when 
we can get the water'' and it generally comes down about 
the first of May, (Retrial R. 112). He irrigates until 
October, (Retrial R. 113). On cross-examination he ad-
mitted that after dry 'vinters earlier irrigation might be 
needed, (Retrial R. 117), and that they irrigate their 
lawns about April 15th, (Retrial R. 117). He also· said 
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there are seasons when it is beneficial to water the pas-
tures until "the end of October", (Retrial R. 117) and 
that a late irrigation of alfalfa is very desirable and 
that this should be done after ''the frost is severe enough, 
so that your growing season has stopped. '' (Retrial R. 
117). 
This is all the evidence on the length of the growing 
season. Every witness testified that in some years water 
is needed in April and some in March. Every witness 
also saw value from irrigating in October. 
The injunction issued has had the effect of awarding 
all of the April and October water to the defendants, 
whose lands are in the same 320 acre half section, as are 
the plaintiffs. If plaintiffs do not need this early and 
late water, neither do defendants, and plaintiffs should 
not have been enjoined. 
We thought at the trial and think now that it is 
beneficial to irrigate the lands as late in the Fall as 
water is available. Defendants apparently think so too, 
because they definitely wanted the plaintiffs restricted 
by injunction to a short irrigation season. But they 
wanted to be free from any like restriction on their use 
and strenuously objected to a finding that it was not bene-
ficial to irrigate their lands before April 25th or after 
September 22nd. Defendants have thus succeeded, with-
out proving any water right, in limiting the plaintiffs to 
a 150 day season, with an injunction which has the effect 
of awarding defendants all of the waters of MeN a ugh ton 
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Gulch between September 22nd and the follo,ving April 
25th. They can have the plaintiffs punished for contempt, 
even though plaintiffs are not interfering 'vith defend-
ants or. their rights. This short season enforced by an 
injunction, we believe is error. 
POINT IV. THE COURT ERRED IN PLACING ANY 
INJUNCTIONS AGAINST THE PLAINTIFFS. 
We consider it to be fundamental la-\v that no one 
is entitled to have an injunction unless he can :first show 
that he has a valid right ,,·hich will be interfered with 
unless the injunction issues. It would be difficult to find 
a principle of law more clearly established and so free 
from conflict in the general authorities. In this case, the 
plaintiffs after having told the court (Retrial R. 123) 
defandants after having told the court (Retrial R. 123) 
attempted to prove any water right at all, were granted 
an injunction. They do not ask for an injunction in their 
pleadings, (R. 8). The injunction entered did not simply 
enjoin the plaintiffs from interfering with the defend-
ants' rights, because defendants had not proved, and did 
not even attempt to prove any rights. The injunction 
was more general, making the plaintiffs subject to a 
contempt citation if they use water beyond their rights. 
There are two fundamental elements necessary to sus-
tain an injunction, both of which are totally lacking here. 
First, the defendants have not shown that they have any 
right 'vhatsoever which needs to be protected by an in-
junction, and second, there is no showing that there will 
be irreparable injury to the defendants if the plaintiffs 
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use "\Vater in a manner different from that decreed. There 
also is an affirmative injunction which orders the plain-
tiffs to install and maintain at their o'vn expense bypass 
facilities past their various dams. The authorities leave 
no doubt concerning the error of the court in this regard. 
The subject is treated generally by numerous texts. 
In 43 C.J.S. page 424 ff, the subject is generally dis-
cussed. It is noted in Section 15 that the power to issue 
injunctions should be exercised "with great caution", 
and only where the reason and necessity therefor are 
"clearly established". Then in Section 19 it is stated: 
''The existence of a right violated is a pre-
requisite to the granting of an injunction; an in-
junction 'vill not issue to protect a right not in 
esse and w·hich may never arise.'' 
In general text supporting the above statement it is 
noted: 
"Where it is clear that the complainant does 
not have the right that he claims he is not entitled 
to an injunction either temporary or perpetual to 
prevent .a violation of such supposed right." 
It is pointed out that injunctive relief is a ''remedy'' and 
not in itself a cause of action, and that a cause of action 
must always exist before injunctive relief can be granted. 
See also Story's Equity Jurisprudence 1233. 
The Utah Supreme Court, consistent with the above 
rule, has always required that there be a right in the 
nature of a property right owned by the complainant 
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before equity will grant an injunction. For that matter, 
the cases from all of the states are entirely in harmony 
with the general text statements cited above. In Old 
Telegraph Mining Company v. The Cen.tral Cement Com-
pany, 1 Utah 331, an action was sought to enjoin the 
defendant from a trespass upon a certain mining claim. 
The defense 'vas that the plaintiff did not own the claim. 
Although there was no showing that the defendant owned 
the claim, the court denied the injunction, stating: 
"In order to entitle the plaintiff to the relief 
asked 'vhere that relief is injunctive only, the title 
of the plaintiff to the property said to be tres-
passed upon, must be clearly shown and be undis-
puted or steps taken to establish the title by 
action at law, or valid and satisfactory reasons 
be shown for not doing so.'' 
The rule was restated and applied in lJ!cGregor v. 
Mining Compan.y, 14 Utah 47. Again the property in-
volved was a mining claim. The court said: 
''Ordinarily, this remedy by injunction will not 
be exercised when the right of the complainant is 
doubtful and has not been settled at law. Even 
when it has been settled, an injunction will not 
be granted 'vhen the remedy at la'v is adequate." 
See also Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Water and 
Electric Power Company, 25 Utah 457, 71 P. 1069, in 
I 
which the court said : 
"At common law a riparian owner below was 
entitled to no redress against his neighbor above 
for the use of water when no injury resulted * * ~~= 
and · in this regard there is no change under the 
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law of appropriation. Indeed it would be contrary 
to the universal sense of mankind to permit re-
dress where there has been no wrong * * * so long 
as his use is neither interfered with nor abridged, 
an appropriator has no just cause to complain, 
although another appropriator above him also 
uses the same water for a beneficial use.'' 
In Dameron Valley Reservoir and Canal Company 
v. Bleak, 61 Utah 230, 211 P. 974, plaintiff brought an 
action to determine the respective rights of plaintiff and 
defendant to certain waters. The court noted that both 
parties had proved that they diverted some water from 
the stream, but that the defendant had the prior right. 
The court said : 
''In Long on Irrigation in Section 113, the law 
is stated thus: 
'In order to entitle the claimant of a water 
right to an injunction for damages in an action 
for an alleged interference with his right, it 
must, of course, appear that his right has been 
invaded, and an injunction will not be granted 
in such an action to restrain the defendant from 
diverting the water of the stream in question 
where it appears that the water diverted would 
not have reached the plaintiff's land even if the 
defendants had permitted it to flow in its natural 
channel.' '' 
In Stauffer v. Uta.h Oil Refining Compa;ny, 85 Utah 
388, the plaintiff sought an injunction, complaining of 
excessive use of certain artesian waters by the defend-
ants. The court denied the injunction stating: 
''Before plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction 
or judgment for damages, they must establish by 
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a preponderance of the evidence, that they are not 
receiving the \Vater to \Yhich they are entitled, and 
that the defendant by the acts complained of has 
\vrongfully deprived them of such \Vater.'' 
The Utah Court in the Sta·uff er case, supra, cited a 
California case (Hudson v. Dailey, 105 Pac. 784), with 
approval. There the court had said that the plaintiff's 
remedy would not be to enjoin the use of \Vater by de-
fendant, but ''to have the respective rights of the parties 
determined as riparian owners, and before plaintiffs 
could have the aid of the court to enjoin the defendants' 
use they would have to sho\v that use \Vas in excess of 
their rights and resulted in the plaintiff's injury.'' 
The authorities from other states are to the same 
effect. For example, in Ki·ng Cottnty v. Port of Seattle, 
(Wash.) 203 P. (2d) 834, the court considered a petition 
for an injunction to prevent a certain cab company from 
getting the exclusive privilege to transport passengers. 
The court said : 
"It is incumbent upon one who seeks relief by 
temporary or permanent injunction to show a 
clear, equitable or legal title and a \Yell-grounded 
fear of immediate invasion of that right. Further-
more, the actions complained of must establish an 
actual and substantial injury or affirmative pros-
pect thereof to the complainant.'' 
See also Jacobs v. An~erican Bank & TTust Company, 
(Okla.) 68 .P. ( 2d) 801, involving an injunction to prevent 
the defendant from selling certain lands claimed by plain-
tiff. After holding plaintiff had failed to establish title 
to the land, the court said : 
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"Plaintiff must have title to property or some 
interest therein before an injunction \Vill be 
granted at his instance to protect it. And he must 
stand on the strength of his O\Vll title, rather than 
on the \veakness of right and title claimed by his 
opponents.'' 
It is respectfully submitted that in law no person is 
entitled to an injunction except to protect a right which 
is clearly established. Here the defendants have told the 
court that they have proved no \Vater rights and that they 
do not desire to try to prove any, (Retrial R. 123). Even 
had they proved a right and sought an injunction they 
would at the very most only be permitted injunctive relief 
to protect those rights. They \vould not be entitled to 
enjoin the plaintiffs from using public water or the 
waters of third persons. Defendants ·could not have an 
injunction except upon a sho\ving that the plaintiffs' use 
would interfere with defendants' rights. 
It may be asserted that the plaintiffs can not be 
heard to complain if they are awarded everything to 
which they are entitled. The answer is that an injunction 
is extremely onerous and burdensome. Even \vith an 
extremely stable stream, an injunction of this type would 
be a burdensome thing. If plaintiffs' 92 hours and 24 
minutes ends when he is occupied by other things, he 
must nevertheless leave the things he might be doing and 
go to the land and release the water to the defendants. 
The injunction does not merely require plaintiffs not to 
take defendants' water-it orders plaintiffs affirmatively 
to release the water. 
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On a fluctuating stream the problem is much more 
acute. For example, plaintiffs may set their dams so aH 
to take only the water allocated to them, but with the 
stream varying in flow from day to day, because of up-
stream practices, plaintiffs may find themselves in con-
tempt of court unless they stay in personal attendance 
throughout the turn. A dam set to take t'vo cubic feet 
of "\Vater from a stream "~ill certainly take more water 
than two feet if the upstream irrigation practices cause 
the stream to rise. With a fluctuating stream, the pro b-
lem can not be handled by an automatic divider. When 
the stream is low plaintiffs must put in a tight dam to 
take all of the water in the stream. Even with a tight 
dam, they will not get the two feet to which they are 
entitled when the flow is of a negligible amount. Still 
such a tight dam would place them in contempt of court 
if the stream rose to two feet, or more, in their absence. 
Thus on land of very low economic value the senior 
appropriators, 'vho for fifty years have had the prior 
right to use the "cater, nOY\r find themselves obligate~ 
either to set their dams so lo'v that even a rising stream 
will not divert more than two cubic feet, thus giving them 
less than 3.5 acre feet of 'vater per year, or they must set 
their dams so that they will take exactly all of the water 
up to two feet of water and then remain in constant 
attendance for four days and nights so that the fluctuat-
ing stream 'vill never throw on to their lands more than 
two c.f.s. of "\Vater. 
If this were the only manner in which the defendants 
could be protected, there would be more argument for 
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it. But where as here the defendants have failed to prove 
that they have any water right at all and have failed 
even to suggest that such a rigid control on the plaintiff 
is necessary to prevent irreparable injury to the de-
fendants, it is clearly error to place such onerous re-
strictions upon the plaintiffs. 
It is doubtful that restrictions of this type could be 
justified even had the defendants proved valid \\~nter 
rights, because, first, the court has found and the evidence 
shows that the stream is not measurable and that the 
stream is fluctuating. In order to protect and assure to 
the plaintiffs their rights on such a stream, they must 
be given some latitude in the use of their \Vater. Second, 
it is undisputed that l\IcN a ugh ton Gulch gains \Vater 
throughout its length. Waters seep into the gulch helo\v 
McNaughton's land and are available to the downstream 
users, including the defendants. Had defendants been 
required to prove the existence and extent of their rights, 
almost certainly their rights \vould have been filled \Vith-
out in any way restricting MeN aughton during part of 
each year. Third, it is physically impossible for defend-
ants' lands to need water in March, April, October and 
November, if the court is correct in its finding that J\ic-
Naughtons do not. The lands are all \vithin a one-half 
mile radius. They are on the same gulch; with a common 
fence line. The irrigation season simply must be the same 
for all the lands. IIow then can defendants possibly show 
''irreparable harm'' to sustain an injunction from a use 
of water by J\icNaughton before .A.pril 25th or after Sep-
tember 22nd ~ If none of the parties could use 'vater 
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beneficially before April 25th or after September 22nd, 
none of them could suffer ''irreparable harm'' from a 
use of that water by another. 
Nor in the absence of some showing that somebody 
had a water right was it proper to order affirmatively 
that l\icNaughton at his expense construct and maintain 
by-pass facilities through his dams. The evidence is clear 
that for 48 years and more McNaughton has maintained 
tight dams across the MeN aughton Gulch. Now without 
a showing that anyone else in the world has a right to 
any gulch 'vater, or that these tight dams injure anyone, 
McNaughton is ordered to go to the expense of construct-
ing and maintaining by -pass facilities and will be in 
contempt of court if he fails so to do. 
r~rhe net result of this injunction is to award to the 
defendants (who did not "rant to prove any rights) all 
of the "\Vater of l\1cNaughton Gulch not decreed to plain-
tiffs. Because plaintiffs are under an injunction, they 
can not divert water until April 25th, regardless of need. 
Thus, until April 25th all of the water in the gulch can 
forever be used by these defendants to the exclusion of 
the plaintiffs. The same is true after September 22nd. 
It is "\Yell established under the water law of Utah 
that anyone can use the public waters of the State prior 
to the time they have been validly appropriated. (Des-
eret Livestock Co. v. Howells Livestock Co., 259 P. 2d 
607.) If none of the defendants have appropriated the 
water of McNaughton Gulch during the months of March, 
April, October and November, (and the record fails to 
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sho'v that they have), then the waters are insofar as this 
record shows public \Vater and the ~IcNaughtons should 
not have been enjoined from using them if in their judg-
ment their lands needed water that early or late. The 
law contemplates that they be free to use the water \vhich 
otherwise would merely run to \Vaste. Some of the de-
fendants' own witnesses testified that application of 
water on alfalfa in the late fall S~flson, after the growing 
season is stopped by frost, is beneficial to an alfalfa 
crop, (Retrial 117). There \vas also testimony that the 
use of water in the late season to wash alkaline salts 
from the land is beneficial, (Retrial 22). Further, if the 
waters accumulating in the gulch during the summer have 
not been appropriated, McNaughton should be permitted 
to use the water to suit his convenience. Also if use of 
a larger irrigation head (a larger rate of flow) \vould 
not interfere \Vith the rights of anyone, he should not 
have been enjoined from using a larger head. 
The ridiculous result which obtains from the trial 
court's opinion leaves the senior appropriators so re-
stricted in their use of the \Vater as to essentially deprive 
them of the benefits of their appropriation, and destroys 
their vested rights, while the defendants who have been 
adjudicated to hold inferior rights, have been granted 
an injunction which is tantamount to an award of all the 
water in the gulch. This, even though they did not ask 
for an injunction, and asserted to the trial court that 
they had not attempted to prove any water rights and 
that their water rights were not in issue. rrhe cases cited 
above demonstrate that this injunction is fundamental 
~nd prejudicial error. 
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POINT V. THE COURT ERRED IN FIXING THE 
DUTY AT 3.5 ACRE FEE'l, P:B~R ACRE. 
· The matter of duty of water is discussed extensively 
by Wiel, '' \\T a.ter Rights in the Western States'', begin-
ning at page 522. He points out that many states have 
by statute provided minimums and maximums. Utah 
has not done so. \Veil says that in the absence of statute, 
the matter is not settled at any particular level, but 
''In determining· the duty of water as applied 
to the conditions in any particular case, evidence 
should be from actual experiment and measure-
ment, if possible. Opinion evidence is of less value 
than experiment, as to which the head of water 
influences its duty, the less the head, the greater 
the quantity needed to spread it over the land, 
and evidence should be as definite as possible.'' 
He then goes on to discuss various factors which affect 
the duty, including loss in transmission, climate, soil 
conditions, large losses by percolation beyond the reach 
of plant roots, and the amount lost in necessary fluming. 
The subject matter of duty of "rater is also exten-
sively discussed in ''Kinney on Irrigation and Water 
Rights'', beginning on page 1591. He lists various fac-
tors \vhich have been investigated by the Department of 
Agriculture tending to solve the problems as to the 
proper duty of water under all conditions. 2 
2 (1) The quantity of water required by different crops; (2) The 
length of the irrigation period in different sections of the arid and 
semi-arid regions of the west; (3) The an1ount or divergence between 
the quantity of water used in irrigation in the different months of the 
growing season, and the rise and fall of streams during those months· 
( 4) The benefits of reservoirs and the percentage of the total discharg~ 
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of streams which must be stored in order to utilize the whole supply; 
( 5) Losses in canals from seepage and evaporation; ( 6) Influence of 
different forms of water right contracts in promoting economy or 
waste; ( 7) The return from the use in irrigation of an acre foot of 
water; (8) The head of water and the quantity entering the intake. 
He then proceeds with a discussion of the above itmns. He defines duty 
as "the quantity essential to successfully irrigate a definite tract of 
land." 
He then says : 
''The economical use of water might be carried 
to the extent that no crops could be raised or at 
least very poor crops. * * * But \vhere an appro-
priator has a prior right to ample \Vater to irrigate 
properly a certain tract of land, the successful 
raising of the crops thereon shottld not be made 
to g,ive tuay by an award of a quantity of water 
tuhich would require too great econ,omy in its use. 
The object of these rules is to suppress, as far as 
possible, the \Yaste of water, and an award of this 
nature would be going to the other extreme and 
uJould require an economy in tlze use of the water 
at the expense of successful resttlts. The water 
supply of the country should be conserved to the 
greatest possible extent consistent with its suc-
cessful use for all beneficial purposes for which 
it may be appropriated. Further than this we 
should not go.'' (Page 1394) 
Kinney notes that no hard and fast rule can be made 
as to the duty of water; that the proper duty can only 
be determined from the facts surrounding each pa rticu-
lar case. What might be the proper quantity of water 
for one tract might not be the proper quantity for an 
another tract. Kinney has a very detailed discussion 
of all the conditions which should be considered, and of 
the wastage of water. He recognizes that economy in the 
use of water might be carried to the extreme so as to 
make the result ridiculous. We, of course, recognize 
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that a sprinkling system would more efficiently use the 
"\Vater than flooding the "\Vater, as is more commonly done. 
vV e recognize that ditches have greater seepage loss than 
pipelines; that levelland will take less 'vater than uneven 
land; that irrigating with a large irrigation head will 
permit more efficient use of the water than irrigating 
with a small head; that using the water with storage 
and equalizing reservoirs is more efficient than being 
required to take the water as it comes; that an irrigator 
in constant attendance can reduce excessive runoff on 
the surface, etc. It is al,vays, therefore, important to 
keep in mind the nature of the economic use. Certain 
localities by their very nature do not justify irrigation 
practices which might be justified by the irrigation of 
row crops, a citrus orchard, or a hothouse. 
The evidence is clear that the common method of 
applying water in Ashley Valley is to divert in ditches 
and apply the 'vater by flooding on to the land. In the 
flooding of "\Vater upon the land, some waste is indispens-
able to reasonable results. 
Utah Cases 
The Utah Supreme Court is, of course, in harmony 
with the theory that the duty of water must be deter-
mined in each individual case in accordance with the 
particular facts of each case. For example, in Jackson 
v. Spanish Fork & West Field Irrigation Comp·any, 223 
P. (2d) 827, the Supreme Court approved the full-time 
use of 1 c.f.s. on only 19 acres of land. In Big Cotton-
wood Lower Canal Company v. Cook, 73 Utah 383, 274 
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Pac. 474, the court approved four acre feet per acre 
for irrigation purposes. In Jensen v. Birch Creek Ranch, 
76 Utah 356, 289 Pac. 1097, the court held that one cubic 
foot of water to irrigate 10 acres of land was too high. 
The closest Utah case to the one at bar from a fact 
situation is Sharp v. Whitmore, 51 Utah 14, 168 Pac. 273. 
rrhis was an action to quiet title to the \Yaters of Grassy 
Trail Creek in Carbon County. Whitmore, \vho \\Tas held 
to have the prior right, was the farthest upstream. A_fter 
he irrigated his lands, vvaste waters returned by deep 
percolation and surface runoff to the stream and became 
available to the downstream users. The trial court found: 
"That Grassy Trail C1·eek is a mountain 
stream flowing through Sunnyside Canyon and 
has a short, quick "Tatershed, and varies greatly 
in its volume of flow, one yea.r tcith another, and 
at di.ff erent ti1nes in the sa.me year, a.nd even upon 
rliffere1lf days. That it is fed by mountain sno\v 
and mountain storms and furnishes no constant 
or uniform volume of flow or supply. That by 
reason thereof no duty of \Vater extending through 
the season can be fixed, as the stream becomes 
entirely dry in the majority of years and the times 
when water ceases to flo\v depends each year on 
conditions as to precipitation and mountain 
storms, and the court finds that for S'UCh rea.son 
it is necessary that each of the appropriators a.s 
he1·eto found use such quantity of 1taler in the 
seasons of greatest .flou} of said creek as can be 
beneficially spread upon said lands, and does find 
that the quantity above mentioned can be bene-
ficially used by each of said pa l'ties. * * * '' 
The Supreme Court stated that there \Vere t\vo issues 
on appeal, one of which was: 
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''Did the court err in determining the duty of 
water on the lands described in the pleadings* * * '' 
Further reference to the trial court's findings discloses 
that Whitmore had 125 acres of land. The trial court 
allo,ved 4 cubic feet of water per second as a continuous 
flow to irrigate that land . The Supreme Court increased 
this to 5 c.f.s. ( 1 c.f.s. for each 25 acres). The Supreme 
Court considered practically all of the factors mentioned 
above by Kinney, that is, the nature of the crops, the 
fluctuating stream, the nature of the soil, transmission 
losses, where the return flow went after Whitmore used 
it, etc. 3 
3The court said: 
"The evidence shows that the irrigated land ( 125 acres) * * * 
extends along and on either side of Grassy Trail Creek a distance 
of about one and one-half miles, and is divided into five fields. The 
slope or fall of the land is toward the creek channel. * * * It is 
conceded that 'Grassy Trail Creek is a natural stream of water 
varying widely in the volume of its ftow one year to another and at 
different times during the same season'. * * * The evidence without 
conflict shows that the soil of the irrigated portions of the Whit-
more Ranch is a sandy loam underlaid with sand and gravel and 'is 
of a character that requires considerable water for proper iniga-
tion.' The evidence further shows that the waste water and some 
seepage water from the irrigated lands ftows into the cheek channel. 
Joseph R. Sharp, respondent, testified on this point in part, as 
follows: 'More or less of the water that is used upon the Whitmore 
Ranch during the high water season and during the inigation 
season finds its ·way back into the channel of the stream by drainage 
and seepage and comes into the channel before it reaches my place. 
* * * There is no other place for it to go.' * * * 
"Caleb Tanner, a civil engineer, was called by plaintiff and testi-
fied that he was on the Whitmore ranch five or six hours, and ob-
served the character of the soil and the size of the diverting ditches; 
that in his judgment 'each separate ditch would carry as much as 
five cubic feet per second'; that, because of the loose and porous 
condition of the soil the 'minimum head he would advise using on 
the hay lands would be five second feet in order to get over the 
territory.' * * * 
"* * * The positive testimony of practical farmers who have 
irrigated these lands for many years is to the effect that it requires 
a continuous stream of five cubic feet per second during the high-
water season, and all of the creek after the flow of high water 
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The trial court, basing its opinion on conflicting evi-
dence, limited Whitmore to 4 cubic feet per second con-
tinuous flow. The Supreme Court increased this to 5 
cubic feet per second and said: 
''We are of the opinion that the greater and 
overwhelming weight of the evidence shows that 
a continuous fio'v of five cubic feet of water per 
second during the irrigation season can be and 
has been for many years economically applied on 
the vVhitmore Ranch, and that this amount is 
necessary to properly irrigate the land during 
that period. The case is therefore remanded with 
directions to the trial court to strike out the word 
'four' and insert the word 'five' in its fourth 
finding of fact * * * and decreeing Whitmore to 
be the prior appropriator of, and entitled to di-
vert, five cubic feet per second of the waters of 
Grassy Trail Creek. ''/.< * * '' 
Justice Frick, in a special concurrence says : 
'' * * * I have less hesitancy in arriving at the 
foregoing conclusion, and in concurring in the 
modification of the district court's findings and 
decree, for the reason that the evidence leaves 
no room for doubt that a large portion of the 
water that is used on Whitmore's land immedi-
ately finds its way back into Grassy Trail Creek, 
and thus becomes available to the plaintiffs whose 
lands lie below Whitmore's lands. In modifying 
the findings of fact and the decree, therefore, no 
injustice ean possibly result to the plaintiffs, while 
if Whitmore were limited to the use of four second 
feet of \Vater only he might suffer irreparable 
injury. While in my judgment, ordinarily, this 
court should be slow to interfere \vith the findings 
of fact and decrees of the trial courts in water 
cases, yet when, as here, injury might result if 
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the findings and decree were permitted to stand 
and no injury can result by modifying them, as is 
done in the opinion of Mr. Justiee McCarty, it, in 
my judgment, becomes the duty of this court to 
make the modification.'' 
In my opinion, the t\vo cases are a direct parallel in 
the following particulars : 
1. In both cases the stream varied in flow from year 
to year, season to season, and day to day. See Findings 
5 and 6 here and compare vfith Finding 9 on page 18 of 
Volume 51, Utah Reports. 
2. In both cases it is necessary to take the water 
as it comes. In neither case was there any available 
storage and as found by the District Court in the Sharp 
case, because the stream flow varies, "it is necessary 
that each of the appropriators * * * use such quantity 
of water in the seasons of greatest flow of said creek as 
can be beneficially spread upon the lands.'' 
3. In each case the drainage from the lands irri-
gated is back to the source. The evidence is not contra-
dicted in this case that ~fcNaughton's lands lie along 
either side of the gulch with the drainage back to the 
gulch. Ex. 1 and A, Finding No. 10.4 
4Finding 10. "That at the lower end of this north gulch there is a 
drain ditch which commences a few feet north of the north gulch and 
extends across the east end of the MeN aughton property and empties 
into the MeN a ugh ton Gulch; that the slope of the land is from the 
north gulch to the MeN aughton Gulch, so that any water flowing into 
said drain ditch will flow into the McNaughton Gulch; that the drain 
ditch crosses over the most \vesterly ditch used by any of the defend-
ants leading from their upper point of diversion and said drain ditch 
empties the ·waters into the MeN aughton Gulch above all other points 
of diversion of the defendants from the McNaughton Gulch." (R. 72) 
32 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the Sharp v. TVhitn~ore case, supra, it was this 
particular factor which induced the Supreme Court to 
increase the award from 4 to 5 c.f.s. As noted by Justice 
Frick in his special concurrence, it could in no way preju-
dice the do,vnstream users if Whitmore were given too 
much water, but would irreparably harm Whitmore if 
he were given too little. 
4. The next similarity bet,veen the Sharp v. Whit-
more case and the case at bar is that the land is under-
laid with sand and gravel in both cases, and both involved 
sandy soil. Here there is a conflict as to the extent of 
the sandy soil on lVIcNaughton's farm, but all of the 
witnesses testified that at least part of the l\IcN a ugh ton 
farm is sandy. Engineer Gardner classified practically 
all of the McNaughton farm as being of sandy loam, (Re-
trial 25). Some of the defendants' witnesses testified 
that certain areas were sandy and part clay, (Retrial 99). 
There was no conflicting evidence as to the nature of the 
subsoil. Gardner, the only witness who testified on this 
point, testified that in the bottom of the gulch there is 
a bed of gravel \vhich is causing the water to accumulate 
in the gulch. He said that the gravel underlaying the 
McNaughton farm is such that it would carry great 
quantities of water back to the gulch, and because of this 
he was of the opinion that the ground \Vater level \vould 
not substantially increase even under heavy irrigation, 
(Retrial 15). 
5. The. court can take judicial kno,vledge of the 
location of Grassy Trail Creek in the east end of Carbon 
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County. The elevation is very similar to that of Vernal. 
The area of Grassy Trail Creek is not very far removed 
from the Vernal area, and certainly the climatic condi-
tions are similar. 
MeN aughton testified at the previous trial (R. 152 
and 221) that by using all of the water accumulating in 
the gulch he did not have sufficient water to irrigate his 
land. Defendants' witness Hoeft said MeN aughton al-
ways kept a tight dam and used all the water, (R. 101). 
Witness Lee testified that MeN a ugh ton used all of the 
water accumulating in the gulch and still his land burned, 
(R. 29). Because there has not been enough gulch water, 
MeN aughton has always maintained some canal stock. 
By releasing the water coming to him under his canal 
stock, and commingling it with the waters of the gulch 
he was able to get a large enough irrigation head and 
enough water to permit efficient irrigation and also to 
mature his crops. The Record stands without dispute 
that McNaughton has consistently released his canal 
water in order to permit him to water his lands ade-
quately, (R. 152-3). He did have some canal stock, which 
he rented, (R. 154) but he always reserved part of his 
stock and the waters accumulating under it to supple-
ment the waters from the gulch. We think that it is 
conclusively established that during part of every normal 
irrigation season MeN aughton is not able to get sufficient 
water from the gulch to permit him to adequately irrigate 
his place. If he is restricted to 92 hours each ten days 
it is certain his lands will burn. 
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We have the opinion of Engineer Gardner that the 
~IcNaughton lands require 6 acre feet of water per acre. 
The basis of his opinion showed that he did take into 
consideration the factors which the Supreme Court has 
said were important, (Retrial 20). Witness Christensen, 
who also is an engineer, testified that in his opinion this 
land could be efficiently irrigated with 3 acre feet per 
acre on the clay parts, (Retrial 93), but that more would 
be needed on the sandy parts, (Retrial 99). This witness 
admitted that in all of Ashley Valley under the Ashley 
Valley Upper Canal, an allowance of 3 acre feet per acre 
from the canal is made and that when they kept records 
it worked out that they got 3 acre feet per year, (Retrial 
92). He also testified that reservoir stock was used to 
bring the amount up to 3.2 c.f.s., (Retrial 93). He and 
every other witness who testified on the matter confessed, 
however, that this did not prove adequate in ordinary 
years. Defendants' witness Lewis, who testified concern-
ing his use age from the canal and reservoir stock at the 
final hearing, stated unequivocally that the water right 
thus provided was not adequate, (Retrial 87). Even Mr. 
Christensen, who gave as his opinion that 3 acre feet 
was enough, testified on page 259 of the record at the 
former trial that the 3.2 acre feet was not enough. His 
testimony was as follows: 
"Q. Now when asked by Mr. Colton whether 
or not the Ashley Valley Canal stock, one share 
of it irrigated ten acres, you said it would during 
the first part of the season. I ask you now, will it 
during the late part of the season. 
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A. I think the ans,Yer was it 'vould during the 
first part of the season. 
Q. Yes. N o"\V~ my question is, would it during 
the late part of the season~ 
A. Ordinary years, no.'' 
Therefore, 'vhile the experts who have given their opin-
ions vary somewhat, even the defendants' expert con-
fesses that on the sandy soil more water would be neces-
sary, and that 3.2 acre feet is not adequate in Ashley 
Valley as a 'vhole during ordinary years. 
Every single witness who testified on the subject, 
whether for the defendants or for the plaintiffs, testified 
that McNaughton for half a century maintained tight 
dams in MeN a ugh ton Gulch and took all of the water 
which accumulated therein, (R. 12, 15, 19, 63, 73, 100, 
140). The trial court also so found, (R. 71). These dams 
diverted out on to the l\1cN aught on lands all of the waters 
accumulating in the Gulch. Not,vithstanding this, the 
defendants' expert, Mr. Christensen, admitted that the 
high spots on the McNaughton ground appeared to be 
underirrigated, but that the lo'v spots were overirrigated, 
(RetriallOO). This is in harmony with the testimony of 
Gardner that in irrigating uneven land you must over-
irrigate the low spots to cause water to seep into the 
high spots, (Retrial 10). With all the water running on 
to his land McNaughton has testified that he has not had 
enough water, (R. 152), and many witnesses testified, 
and the defendants now contend that McNaughton has 
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been compelled through shortage of water at his points 
of diversion to supplement the gulch water with 'vater 
diverted from the Ashley Canal under his canal stock, 
(R. 29, 221, 101, 152). Still another independent witness 
testified that with all the 'vater being diverted from the 
gulch by tight dams, the NicN a ugh ton lands burn, (R. 29). 
We have already detailed all of the evidence above show-
ing the length of the irrigation season in Vernal and 
under which every witness admitted that some irrigation 
in early April and late October was beneficial. 
In the face of this testimony the court has awarded 
McNaughton the right to take the \Vater only four days 
out of ten, thus giving him water only 40 per cent of the 
time where for fifty years he had had the tight dams and 
taken all the "\Vater all of the time. Further, during the 
limited time that NicNaughton can take the water he 
must never take more than two cubic feet per second. 
Historically he has taken larger amounts when they were 
available, because during parts of every day and every 
season the flow varies and at low flow it goes do,vn to a 
point where the quantity available is of a negligible 
amount. 
MeN a ugh ton thus, having proved a senior appro-
priation with 48 years of uninterrupted use of all the 
water in the stream, has by restriction had nearly 80 
per cent of the water he has historically used taken from 
him. Historically he used the water in 1\. pril, October 
and November. He is prohibited from using water dur-
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ing any of these months and during the last week in 
September. So he has lost the early and late water and 
has had the water totally taken from him six days out 
of every ten during the summer. Further, during the 
four days when he is permitted to use it he can never 
take more than 2 c.f.s. It is, therefore, crystal clear that 
nearly 80 per cent of the water he has historically used 
has been taken from him by the court's order. Since 
with 100% of the water going to his lands, he still found 
it necessary to use canal water it seems clear that his 
lands will burn from getting only 20% of the amount 
he has historically used. 
In the last analysis with his lands straddling the 
Gulch and sloping to it and with a large drain ditch 
at the lower-end of his land, it is impossible that he can 
injure the defendants. Even had they proved a water 
right, it is not possible for McNaughton to take from 
the Gulch more water than his lands can retain. The 
slope is to the Gulch and the drain ditch on the lower 
end of his field returns any runoff to the gulch upstream 
from any of the points of diversion used or claimed by 
any of the defendants. By referring as we do to the 
surface runoff, we do not imply that surplus water is 
applied. In irrigation by flooding there must always be 
some waste, and this waste water must in this case 
return to the gulch. If the waste water ever were exces-
sive McNaughton could not hold it from the defendants, 
because Nature puts it back to the source. As the court 
held in the Sharp case discussed above, there can be no 
harm to the defendants from a duty fixed too high, but 
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there will be irreparable harm to McNaughton if it IS 
fixed too low. 
POINT VI. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO PROTECT McNAUGHTON'S RIGHT TO 
THE CANAL WATER AND TO FREE IT FROM 
THE RESTRICTIONS. 
The Supreme Court has already held that the waters 
In McNaughton Gulch come there from five sources. 
Three of the sources are public waters. The other two 
are owned by MeN a ugh ton because they are in his con-
trol under previous appropriations. These last t'vo are 
return flow to the gulch from his own irrigation and canal 
water. The defendants have never contended, nor could 
they, that they own any interest whatsoever in plaintiffs' 
canal stock. The plaintiffs should be free to use their 
water under the canal stock whenever the rules and 
regulations of the canal will permit them so to do. There 
should be no restriction as to water released by Me-
N a ugh ton from the canal. Also the restriction to two 
cubic feet should not apply. If there were at any given 
moment two feet of water in the gulch McNaughton 
should be permitted to add his canal water to it to give 
him a better irrigation head. We attempted to have the 
trial court enter findings and conclusions which 'vould 
free MeN a ugh ton's canal water from the restrictions and 
to adjudicate that none of the defendants had any interest 
in the canal water. The trial court erroneously struck 
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these matters from the proposed findings, conclusions 
and decree. 
POINT VII. THE COURT ERRED IN CUTTING 
DOWN THE IRRIGATED ACREAGE TO 66.03 
ACRES. 
As noted under Point I of our brief, the matters 
previously determined by this court have become the 
law of the case. T~e trial court found on the original 
trial that all of MeN aughton's 80 acre tract was irrigated 
except seven acres, (Finding 9, R. 13). The Supreme 
Court said expressly that the water "\Vas used in 1903 
about as it now is. When the defendants tried to intro-
duce evidence relating to the question of irrigated acre-
age, I objected on the grounds that this matter had 
already been settled by the trial court's previous :finding 
"\vhich had been affirmed by this court, (Retrial 86). 
This was argued at length before the trial judge and 
then he sustained my objection refusing to permit the 
parties on retrial to again examine the question of irri-
gatea acreage. 
Then 'vithout notice to either party, the Judge on 
his own motion reduced the irrigated acreage from 73, 
as covered by his original finding 9, to 66.03. The Su-
preme Court has already found that the gulch was from 
three to five rods wide-thus at its narrowest point it 
is 50 feet wide and at its "\videst point it is 85 feet wide. 
It is occupied in the bottom by a very small stream. The 
approximately seven acres which lie within the gulch 
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require water. The court noted in its original findings, 
(Finding 11, R. 13) that the bottom of the gulch 'vas 
filled with forage. Obviously the water to sustain this 
growth must -come from seepage from irrigation of 
upper lands. If the court cuts down the quantity of water 
needed by these upper lands to their bare needs, then 
the surplus which would run from said lands to irrigate 
this seven acres within the gulch just will not be available. 
The court has thus found that land of this character 
needs 3.5 acre feet of water per year. It has found that 
all of the land is arid by Nature, (Finding 13, R. 73). It 
has then subtracted seven acres, because they are within 
the gulch. Clearly these seven acres must be irrigated 
from the runoff from the other lands. Yet in this manner 
we have been deprived of water for seven acres of land. 
We think this error is all the more obvious because 
the trial court ruled on the retrial that he would not 
reconsider his Finding No. 9 (Retrial 86) which related 
to this matter of acreage. Plaintiffs had no warning 
whatsoever that the court had reconsidered this matter. 
There is no evidence whatsoever which will sustain the 
finding of the court to the effect that the bottom of the 
gulch does not need water and his findings are to the 
contrary. 
SUMMARY 
By the various limitations as to season, quantity, 
period of use, duty, etc., the district court has taken from 
us nearly 80% of the water we have historically used. 
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We respectfully submit that these restrictions must be 
lifted and the duty increased and the rate of flow in-
creased so that McNaughton who has had the senior 
right for half a century will not have it taken from him 
by junior appropriators who refused to prove any rights. 
The injunction awarding the stream to the defendants 
must be lifted until they prove a right which has been 
or will be invaded causing them irreparable harm. 
parable harm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDWARD W. CLYDE 
Attorney for Appellants 
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